Virtue - Plato Essay Example for Free

Virtue Plato Es sound outAnd a nonher(prenominal)s who ar mute auditors. The scene is laid in the theater of operations of Cephalus at the Piraeus and the whole dialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it titleu all toldy took place to Timaeus Hermocrates, Critias, and a anonymous person, who be introduced in the Timaeus. I WENT d avow yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess and besides because I wanted to await in what existence- ner they would celebrate the festival, which was a new thing. I was satisfy with the procession of the inhabitants plainly that of the Thracians was evenly, if non to a greater extent, beautiful. When we had finished our prayers and dupeed the spectacle, we dark in the direction of the city and at that irregular Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, chanced to catch sight of us from a distance as we were starting on our hu universeityner home, and terstwhile(a) his s ervant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind, and give tongue to, Polemarchus desires you to wait. I turned round, and exacted him where his master was. in that location he is, verbalise the youth, coming after you, if you provide entirely wait. for sure we will, state Glaucon and in a few minutes Polemarchus appe ard, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucons brother, Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession. Polemarchus said to me, I perceive, Socrates, that you and your companion argon already on your panache to the city. You be non farther-off wrong, I said. precisely do you hold, he rejoined, how m whatsoever we argon? Of course. And argon you stronger than all these? for if non, you will beat to remain where you ar.whitethorn at that place non be the alternative, I said, that we may per- suade you to let us go? only weed you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said. Cer tainly non, replied Glaucon. at that placefore we ar not going to listen of that you may be assured. Adeimantus added Has no nonpareil told you of the torch-race on horseback in honor of the goddess which will outcome place in the evening? With horses I replied. That is a novelty. Will horse custody carry torches and pass them one to other(prenominal) during the race? Yes, said Polemarchus and not only so, yet a festival will be celebrated at night, which you sure as shooting ought to see.Let us rise soon after supper and see this festival at that place will be a gathering of unexampled men, and we will see a siz open talk. support and so, and do not be perverse. Glaucon said, I suppose, since you insist, that we essential. Very veracious, I replied. Accordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house and there we appoint his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon, the son of Aristonym us. There too was Cephalus, the father of Polemarchus, whom I had not seen for a long beat, and I popular judicial decision him very much aged.He was seated on a cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had been sacrificing in the court and there were some other chairs in the room arranged in a semicircle, upon which we sat down by him. He saluted me eagerly, and past he said You dont come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought If I were still able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. yet at my age I provoke hardly get to the city, and because you should come oftener to the Piraeus. For, let me recognize you that the more the cheers of the body fade away, the greater to me are the pleasure and charm of conversation.Do not, because, deny my request, but make our house your re- sort and clench comp some(prenominal) with these young men we are old friends, and you will be quite at home with us. I replied There is nothing which for my part I like break in, Cephalus, than conversing with aged men for I regard them as travellers who r each(prenominal) gone a journey which I too may lay down to go, and of whom I ought to inquire whether the way is smooth and easy or rugged and difficult. And this is a question which I should like to ask of you, who project arrived at that era which the poets call the threshold of old age Is life harder toward the end, or what report do you give of it?I will testify you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age mint together we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb dictates and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is I fuckingnot eat, I lavatorynot drink the pleasures of youth and love are fled away there was a ethical age at one time, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some complain of the slights which are congeal upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of how many d loathsomenessishs their old age is the cau se. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to cull that which is not authentically in fault.For if old age were the cause, I too, being old, and every other old man would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experi- ence, nor that of others whom I have sleep withn. How head I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in resolution to the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles are you still the man you were? Peace, he replied most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my creative thinker since, and they seem as unsloped to me now as at the time when he uttered them.For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom when the pas- sions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles speculates, we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints nigh relations, are to be attributed to the aforementioned(prenominal) cause, which is not old age, but mens characters and tempers for he who is of a calm and happy record will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.I listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go on Yes, Cephalus, I said but I rather suspect that people in general are not impeld by you when you speak thus they think that old age sits lightly upon you, not because of your happy disposition, but because you are rich, and wealth is hygienic known to be a great comforter. You are redress, he replied they are not convinced and there is something in what they say not, however, so much as they imagine.I might answer them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and give tongue to that he was famous, not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian If you had been a native of my country or I of yours, neither of us would h ave been famous. And to those who are not rich and are impatient of old age, the same reply may be do for to the good poor man old age can- not be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace with himself.May I ask, Cephalus, whether your dower was for the most part inherited or acquired by you? Acquired Socrates do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art of making money I have been midway between my father and grandpa for my grandfather, whose report I bear, doubled and trebled the value of his patrimony, that which he inherited being much what I experience now but my father, Lysanias, reduced the property below what it is at present and I shall be at ease if I leave to these my sons not less, but a little more, than I received.That was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you are indifferent about money, which is a feature film rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them the makers of for tunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the union of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their baberen, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men.And hence they are very bad company, for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth. That is true, he said. Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question? What do you dole out to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your wealth? One, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others.For let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near death, fears and cares enter into his attend which he neer had before the tales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here were once a express feelings matter to him, but now he is tormented with the thought that they may be true either from the weakness of age, or because he is now drawing nearer to t hat other place, he has a clear uper view of these things suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, and he begins to reflect and consider what wrongs he has done to others.And when he finds that the sum of his transgressions is great he will many a time like a child start up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But to him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age Hope, he says, cherishes the soul of him who lives in arbiter and holiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man. How admirable are his wordsAnd the great blessing of riches, I do not say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings cod to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes and there-fore I say, that, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest.Well said, Cephalus, I replied but as concerning neerthelessice, what is it? to speak the truth and to pay your debtsno more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Sup- pose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition. You are quite right, he replied.But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of referee. Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said Polemarchus, interposing. I fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polem- archus and the company. Is not Polemarchus your heir? I said. To be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices. submit me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and according to you, truly say, about justice?He said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears to me to be right. I shall be non-white to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but his crockeding, though probably clear to you, is the re- verse of clear to me. For he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I ought to fo chthonian a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it when he is not in his right senses and nevertheless a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt. True. whence when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means to make the return? Certainly not.When Simonides said that the repayment of a d ebt was jus- tice, he did not mean to include that case? Certainly not for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a friend, and never diabolical. You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of a debt that is what you would imagine him to say? Yes. And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them? To be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them and an enemy, as I organize it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to himthat is to say, evil.Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken darkly of the nature of justice for he really meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt. That must have been his consequence, he said. By heaven I replied and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us? He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human bodies. And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what?Seasoning to food. And what is that which justice gives, and to whom? If, Socrates, we are to be point at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies. That is his meaning, then? I think so. And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time of sickness? The physician. Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea? The pilot. And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend?In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other. But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no hire of a physician? No. And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot? No. hence in time of peace justice will be of no use? I am very far from thi nking so. You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war? Yes. Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn? Yes. Or like cobbling for the acquisition of shoes that is what you mean? Yes. And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace?In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use. And by contracts you mean partnerships? Exactly. But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better partner at a impale of draughts? The skilful player. And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than the builder? Quite the reverse. Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the harp-player, as in playing the harp the harp- player is certainly a better partner than the just man? In a money partnership.Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money for you do not want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse a man who is astute about horses would be better for that, would he not? Certainly. And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be better? True. Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to be preferred? When you want a deposit to be kept safely. You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie? Precisely. That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?That is the inference. And when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to the individual and to the State but when you want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser? Clearly. And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you would say that justice is useful but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the role player? Certainly. And so of all other things justice is useful when they are useless, and useless when they are useful? That is the inference. Then justice is not good for much.But let us consider this further point Is not he who can b est strike a blow in a boxing controvert or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a blow? Certainly. And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping from a disease is best able to create one? True. And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to abstract a march upon the enemy? Certainly. Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief? That, I suppose, is to be inferred. Then if the just man is good at guardianship money, he is good at stealing it. implied in the argument. That is Then after all, the just man has turned out to be a thief.And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of bulls eye for he, speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grand- father of Odysseus, who is a favorite of his, affirms that He was first-class above all men in theft and perjury. And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agree that justice is an art of theft to be practised, however, for the good of friends and for the harm of enemies that was what y ou were saying? No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say but I still stand by the latter words. Well, there is another question By friends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in apparent?Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil. Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil many who are not good seem to be so, and conversely? That is true. Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends? True. And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good? Clearly. But the good are just and would not do an injustice? True. Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong? Nay, Socrates the doctrine is immoral.Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust? that better. I like But see the consequence Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit but, if so, we shall be saying the very op- posite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides. Very true, he said and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words friend and enemy. What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked.We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good. And how is the error to be right? We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good and that he who seems only and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend and of an enemy the same may be said. You would contest that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies? Yes. And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say It is just to do good to our friends when they are good, and harm to our enemies when they are evil?Yes, that appears to me to be the truth. But ought the just to injure anyone at all? undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies. When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated? The latter. Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs? Yes, of horses. And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses? Of course. And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man? Certainly. And that human virtue is justice? To be sure.Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust? That is the result. But can the musician by his art make men unmusical? Certainly not. Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen? Impossible. And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad? Assuredly not. Any more than heat can produce cold? It cannot. Or drought moisture? Clearly not. Nor can the good harm anyone? Impossible. And the just is the good? Certainly. Then to injure a friend or anyone else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust?I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates. Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies to say this is not wise for it is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just. I agree with you, said Polemarchus. Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against anyone who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or seer? I am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said.Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be? Whose? I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the first to say tha t justice is doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies. Most true, he said. Yes, I said but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other can be offered? some(prenominal) times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been stick down by the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end.But when Polemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his peace and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panic-stricken at the sight of him. He roared out to the whole company What folly, Socrates, has taken possession of you all? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honor to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer for there is many a one who can as k and cannot answer.And now I will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or pursual, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me I must have clearness and accuracy. I was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I should have been struck dumb but when I saw his petulance rising, I looked at him first, and was therefore able to reply to him. Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, dont be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not in- tentional.If we were seeking for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were knocking under to one another, and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are seeking for justice, a thing more valued than many pieces of gold, do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our bound to get at the truth? N ay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us. How characteristic of Socrates he replied, with a bitter laugh thats your ironical styleDid I not foresee have I not already told you, that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering? You are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, victorious care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering twice half dozen, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me then obviously, if that is your way of putting the question, no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to reproduction Thrasymachus, what do you mean?If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one? is that your meaning? How would you answer him? Just as if the two cases were at all alike he said. Why should they not be? I replied and even if they are not, but only appear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not? I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers? I dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon considerateness I approve of any of them.But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he said, than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you? Done to me as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise that is what I deserve to have done to me. What, and no payment A engaging notion I will pay when I have the money, I replied. But you have, Socrates, said Glaucon and you, Thrasyma- chus, need be under no anxiety about money, for we will all make a role for Socrates. Yes, he repl ied, and then Socrates will do as he always does refuse to answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of someone else.Why, my good friend, I said, how can anyone answer who knows, and says that he knows, just nothing and who, even if he has some faint notions of his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural thing is, that the speaker should be someone like yourself who professes to know and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly answer, for the edification of the company and of myself? Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and Thrasymachus, as anyone might see, was in reality eager to speak for he thought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself.But at first he affected to insist on my answering at length he consented to begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates he refuses to teach himself, and goes about learning of others, to whom he never even says, Thank you. That I learn of others, I repli ed, is quite true but that I am ungrateful I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is all I have and how ready I am to praise anyone who appears to me to speak well you will very soon find out when you answer for I expect that you will answer well.Listen, then, he said I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the engagement of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of course you wont. Let me first picture you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the stakes of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polyd- amas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?Thats abominable of you, Socrates you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument. Not at all, my good sir, I said I am trying to understand the m and I wish that you would be a little clearer. Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of govern- ment differ there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies? Yes, I know. And the authorities is the ruling power in each State? Certainly.And the different forms of government make laws demo- cratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all States there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.Now I understand you, I said and whether you are right or not I will try to discov er. But let me remark that in defining justice you have yourself used the word interest, which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words of the stronger are added. A small addition, you must allow, he said. Great or small, never mind about that we must first inquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say of the stronger about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.Proceed. I will and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for sub- jects to obey their rulers? I do. But are the rulers of States absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err? To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err? Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not? True. When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest when they are mistaken, contrary to their in- terest you admit that? Yes. And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their sub- jectsand that is what you call justice?Doubtless. Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger, but the reverse? What is that you are saying? he asked. I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted? Yes. Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury.For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger? Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Pole marchus. Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness. But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may some- time command what is not for their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.Yes, Polemarchus Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just. Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger. But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest this was what the weaker had to do and this was affirmed by him to be justice.Those were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus. Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not? Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken? Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible, but might be sometimes mistaken. You argue like an informer, Socrates.Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or syntactician at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies they none of the m err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be apt artists.No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is unerr- ing, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest and the subject is required to execute his com- mands and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger. Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an informer?Certainly, he replied. And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any de- sign of injuring you in the argument? Nay, he replied, suppose is not the word I know it but you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.